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THE SUPREME COURT AND PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE: 
DOES GOD STILL HAVE A PLACE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS? 
Charles]. Russo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The dearth of statistical or anecdotal 1 evidence aside, combined with 
the relative lack of reported litigation, it appears that most students and 
teachers regularly participate in perhaps the most common daily school 
ritual by joining in the patriotic recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance 
(Pledge) and the salute to the American Flag.2 Yet, as discussed 
throughout this article, this daily practice has had a history of 
controversy, whether in schools or political settings.3 
Turning specifically to schools, in Newdow v. United States Congress 
(Newdow),4 the Ninth Circuit set off a firestorm of controversy when, in a 
' Charles ]. Russo, }.D., Ed.D., is the Panzer Chair in Education in the School of Education and 
Allied Professions and Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Dayton in Dayton, Ohio. I 
would like to express my great appreciation for my friend and colleague, Dr. Dan Raisch, Associate 
Dean of the School of Education and Allied Professions, for his helpful comments in reviewing 
sections of this manuscript. 
I. But see They Turn Their Back on Pledge, N.Y. Daily News 9 (Oct. 5, 2003) (reporting that 
in a survey of 50 public schools in New York City, officials in 13 locations, all but one located in 
Manhatten, have abandoned the daily recital of the pledge, even though a spokesperson for the 
Chancellor said that the schools will be reminded that reciting the pledge is not an option). 
2. See Emily Tuttle, Student Wins Support to Say Pledge, Lewiston Sun }. 
<http://www.sunjournal.com /print.asp?slg=010904pledge> (Jan. 20, 2004) (detailing a student's 
fight to have the Pledge restored in school). 
3. Controversy has swirled around the Pledge in political campaigns, especially the 1988 
Presidential election between George H.W. Bush and Michael Dukakis. For news coverage of Bush's 
criticism of Dukakis' vetoing a 1977 bill that would have required teachers to lead students in the 
Pledge, see e.g. David Nyhan, A Tide of Hysteria Rolls in on Dukakis, The Boston Globe 14 (Sept. 30, 
1988); Phil Gailey, Bush Campaign Takes a Disturbing Turn with Attacks on Patriotism, St. 
Petersburg I'imes I A (Sept. 11, 1988). For a discussion of the underlying case, see infra note 91 and 
accompanying text. 
4. Ncwdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Newdow I], judgment 
reversed, 3 I 3 U.S. 495 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying the United States Senate's motion to intervene); 
Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 313 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting the suit to proceed even though the 
father lacked custody where the custody order established that he retained rights with respect to the 
child's education and general welfare, and denying the child's mother's motion to intervene), 
amended on denial of rehearing and stayed, 321 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2003), withdrawn from bound 
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case from California, it initially struck down the words "under God" in 
the Pledge of Allegiance for violating the First Amendment's prohibition 
of governmental establishment of religion.5 The court subsequently 
modified its initial judgment and struck the Pledge down on the basis 
that it coerced a religious act.6 Previously, in a case from Illinois, 
Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21 of Wheeling 
Township/ the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the Pledge, including the 
words "under God," was constitutional, as long as children were free not 
to participate in its daily recitation.8 Given the split between these 
circuits, the Supreme Court's decision to hear an appeal in Newdmv II," 
places the Court at the epicenter in the latest battle in the culture wars 10 
over the place of religion in American education. 11 
In light of the Supreme Court's forthcoming ruling on the status of 
the words "under God" in the Pledge, this article is divided into the three 
sections. 12 The first section of the article offers a brief history of the 
Pledge and flag salute, while the second section reviews reported 
litigation involving these rituals, including Newdow. The final section of 
the article ruminates on how the Justices are likely to respond to this 
challenge to the Pledge, Justice Scalia's self-recusal from the litigation, 
and what this dispute means for the Court's wider jurisprudence vis-a-vis 
the place of religion in the marketplace of ideas. 
volume; Newdow v. U.S. Cong .• 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Newdow II], cert. granted 
sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 386 (2003). 
5. Newdow I, 292 F.3d at 612. 
6. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 487. 
7. Sherman v. Community Canso/. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township, 980 F.2d 437 (7th C:ir. 
1992). 
8. Id. 
9. Newdow II, supra n. 6. 
10. The term "culture war" was apparently first used by james Davidson Hunter, Culture 
Wars: The Struggle to Define America (Basic Books 1991); see also Courts and the Culture Wars 
(Bradley C.S. Watson ed., Lexington Books 2002). 
11. The Court has already heard oral arguments this term from a second case that impacts on 
religious freedom and education. In Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, Locke 
v. Davey 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003), the Court is set to decide whether to uphold the Ninth Circuit's 
ruling, which would permit a student to participate in a publicly funded scholarship program that 
would have assisted him in receiving an undergraduate degree in Pastoral Ministries; the student was 
also pursuing business studies. 
12. !'or a much briefer, preliminary version of this analysis, see Charles j. Russo, The Pledge of 
Allegiance: Patriotic Duty or Unconstitutional Establishment of Religion?, 69 No. 7 Sch. Bus. Affairs 
22 (2003). 
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II. HISTORY OF THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE 
In 1892, Francis Bellamy, a Baptist minister and Chair of a 
committee for the National Education Association dealing with state 
superintendents, who was forced to leave his pulpit because of his 
socialist leanings, wrote the Pledge, absent the words "under God." 13 On 
September 8, 1892, about a month after the Pledge first appeared in The 
Youth's Companion, a popular magazine for children, millions of public 
school students recited it for the first time in celebration of the four 
hundredth anniversary of Columbus' discovery of America. 14 Shortly 
thereafter, on October 12, 1892, President Benjamin Harrison issued a 
proclamation "describing Columbus as 'the pioneer of progress and 
enlightenment,"' 15 while also urging educational officials to undertake 
appropriate observations in the schools. 16 
An early sign of support for the Pledge occurred in 1898 when, on 
the day after the United States declared war on Spain, the New York State 
Legislature passed the first statute requiring students to recite the 
Pledge. 17 Similar laws were enacted in Rhode Island in 1801, Arizona in 
1903, Kansas in 1917, and Maryland in 1918. 1x Apparently, in response 
to protests against World War I in 1919, the state of Washington enacted 
the first law directing teachers, under the risk of dismissal, to lead weekly 
flag exercises. 19 Statutes of this type were also adopted in Delaware in 
1925, New Jersey in 1932, and Massachusetts in 1935.20 By 1940, at least 
eighteen states had enacted laws mandating some sort of teaching about 
the flag, while evidence indicates that thirty states had adopted rituals, 
mostly at the local level, calling for some form of reverence for the pledge 
and salute.21 
In 1942, following the trend that had started in the states, Congress 
13. jane Meredith Adams, One Nation Divided: fudges Bar Pledge for Kids Out West, Cites 
Words 'Under God,' Newsday A3 (June 27, 2003); Paul Wagenseil, History: The Pledge ofAllegiance, 
<http:/ /www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly _story/0,3566,56320,00.html> (June 27, 2002). 
14. Wagenseil, supra n. 13. 
15. Exec. Procl. 7720, 68 Fed. Reg. 59515, 59515 (Oct. 10, 2003). (President Bush, recognizing 
that "[i jn commemoration of Columbus' journey, the Congress, by joint resolution of Apr. 30, 1934, 
and modifled in 1968 (36 U.S.C. 107), as amended, has requested that the President proclaim the 
second Monday of October of each year as 'Columbus Day.'"). 
16. David W. Manwaring, Render Unto Caesar: The Flag Salute Controversy 2 (U. of Chi. 
Press 1962). 
17. Id. at 3; see also John]. Concannon, The Pledge of Allegiance and the First Amendment, 23 
Suffdk U. L Rev.1019, 1021 (1989). 
18. Manwaring, supra n. 16 at 3. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. I d. at 4-5. 
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entered into the fray about the Pledge and flag salute in an effort to 
"codify and emphasize existing rules and customs pertaining to the 
display and use of the flag of the United States of America."22 Although 
stopping short of mandating its recitation, the new statute set forth the 
approved wording of the Pledge.23 On June 15, 1954, responding to a 
campaign by the Knights of Columbus, a Roman Catholic fraternal and 
charitable organization, and other religious groups, all of whom were 
motivated by Cold war era fears of communism,24 President Eisenhower 
signed an amendment to the Pledge into law that added the words 
"under God."25 In an attempt to avoid litigation, Congressional sponsors 
of the Act in both the House and Senate disclaimed any religious 
purpose, distinguishing between religion as an institution and a belief in 
the sovereignty of God, agreeing that the modification of the Pledge was 
" ... not an act establishing a religion or one interfering with the 'free 
exercise' of religion."26 
In this regard, the Elk Grove Unified School District's certiorari brief 
raised a noteworthy point that may come into play should the Supreme 
Court keep an open mind with regard to treating the words "under God" 
as a form of "civic deism" (discussed below) 27 rather than an 
establishment of religion. That is, the brief examined the discussion 
between the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress and 
the Assistant Counsel to the House Committee on the Judiciary over 
placement of the words "under God" in the Pledge. To this end, the brief 
points out that the Legislative Reference Service was satisfied "that the 
phrase 'under God' was a modifier to the phrase 'one Nation' because the 
addition was intended to affirm that the United States was founded on a 
fundamental belief in God ... [,) not an intent to establish a religion or to 
22. H.R. Rpt. 77-2047 (Apr. 22, 1942); Sen. Rpt. 77-1477, at§ 1 (June 11, 1942) (codified at 4 
u.s.c. § 4). 
23. The original version of the Pledge read"! pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States 
of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice 
for all." Id. at§ 7. 
24. Maura Dolan, Pledge of Allegiance Violates Constitution, Court Declares Law, I.. A. l'imes 
AI (June 27, 2002); See also Wagenseil, supra n. 13. 
25. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2003): 
The Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag: 'I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of 
America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with 
liberty and justice for all.', should be rendered by standing at attention facing the flag with the 
right hand over the heart. When not in uniform men should remove their headdress with their 
right hand and hold it at the left shoulder, the hand being over the heart. Persons in unitim11 
should remain silent, face the flag, and render the military salute. 
26. Br. for the U.S. in Opposition at 4, Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 2003 WL 22428408, (citing H.R. 
Rpt. 83-1693 at 3) (1954) (citing Zorach v. Clausort, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), Sen. Rpt. 83-12R7 at 2 
(1954)). 
27. See discussion and accompanying text infra n. 154. 
301] SUPREME COURT AND PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE 305 
turn the Pledge into a religious prayer."28 It will be interesting to see 
whether this nuanced discussion has any impact on the Court's analyses. 
More recently, following Newdow I, on November 13, 2002, the 
Senate and House of Representatives adopted a joint resolution 
reaffirming the reference to "one Nation under God in the Pledge of 
Allegiance."2Y As with the initial modification in 1954, Congress 
acknowledged the importance that Americans, as a religious people, 
place in a belief in God. Insofar as litigation over statutes and/or policies 
calling for students and/or teachers to recite the amended Pledge 
(including the words "under God," typically accompanied by ceremonies 
saluting the flag) has reached mixed results, the situation is far from 
clear. 
III. LITIGATION INVOLVING THE PLEDGE 
A. Early Cases 
Opposition to the Pledge and flag salute based on religious grounds, 
albeit not to the words "under God," appeared as early as 191830 when a 
state trial court in Ohio rejected the claim of a Mennonite foster father 
who challenged his arrest and fine for directing his nine-year-old 
daughter to neither attend school nor to salute the American flag. 31 The 
foster father apparently directed the child to refuse to participate because 
of his opposition to war. Conceding that differences of opinion existed 
about American involvement in World War I, the court criticized the 
foster father's conduct as: 
[N]ot conscionable, for conscience would lead to respect for 
government and to its defense, especially in time of war, but rather it is 
the forerunner of disloyalty and treason. All true Americans are 
conscientiously opposed to war, but when war is upon us, we will fight 
and fight until the victory over our enemy is won.32 
Beginning in 1936, a flurry of judicial activity involving the Pledge 
and flag salute, filed mostly by Jehovah's Witnesses,33 began with Nicholls 
2il. Br. for the Sch. Dist. Respts. in Opposition at 3-4, Newdow v. The Cong. of the U.S., 2003 
W L 22428410. 
29. Pub. L. No. 107-293, 116 Stat. 2057 (2002). 
30. !'or a detailed history of the early opposition to the flag salute, see Manwaring, supra n. 16 
at 11-15. 
31. Troyer v. St., 1918 WL 1176 (Ohio Com. Pl. (1918)). 
32. !d. at 3. 
33. "In mid-1936, 120 jehovah's Witnesses were estimated to have been excluded from school 
for this reason. By 1939, the figure had passed two hundred." Manwaring, supra n. 16 at 56 (internal 
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v. Mayor of Lynn34 wherein the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
rejected a challenge based on the First Amendment. 35 The court held 
that as a valid legislative enactment that did not establish a penalty for a 
disobedient student, the school officials had the right "to inculcate 
patriotism and to instill a recognition of the blessings conferred by 
orderly government under the Constitutions of the State and nation." 36 
In addition, the court observed that the Pledge and salute did not restrain 
anyone from worshiping God within the meaning of the First 
Amendment, since they neither relate to nor exact anything in 
opposition to religion.37 
Over the next three years, the Supreme Court refused to hear four 
cases that questioned the constitutionality of the Pledge and/or the flag 
salute, all because they lacked a substantial federal question. In Leoles v. 
Landers,38 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from Georgia where a 
state court affirmed that school officials did not violate the religious 
freedom rights of a sixth grade Jehovah's Witness when she was expelled 
for refusing to salute the flag. 39 The court concluded that officials acted 
incident to their duty to instruct children in the study of and devotion to 
American institutions and ideals.40 A year later, in Hering v. State Board 
of Education, 41 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from New Jersey 
where a state court affirmed that students who were Jehovah's Witnesses 
could be required to recite the Pledge because it was just that, a pledge, 
and not an oath or religious rite. As such, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
concluded that the Pledge was "a patriotic ceremony which the 
Legislature has the power to require of those attending schools 
established at public expense."42 
In Johnson v. Town of Deerfield,43 the Supreme Court summarily 
affirmed an order of the federal trial court in Massachusetts. Earlier, the 
trial court had refused to enjoin a statute that required all students, 
citations omitted). 
34. Nicholls v. Mayor of Lynn, 7 N.F..2d 577 (Mass. 1937). 
35. !d. at 581. 
36. I d. at 579. 
37. Id. at 580. A second case from Massachusetts did not result in reported litigation after a 
father was fined for directing his children not to salute the flag. Manwaring, supra n. 16 at 60. 
38. Leoles v. Landers, 192 S.E. 218 (Ga. 1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 656 ( 1937). 
39. I d. at 223. 
40. I d. at 222. 
41. Herring v. St. Bd. of Ed., 189 A. 629 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1937), affd, 194 A. 177 (N.J. Err. & App. 
1937), appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 624 (1938). 
42. !d. at 629. 
43. Johnson v. Town of Deerfield, 25 F. Supp. 918 (D. Mass. 1939), ajfd, 306 U.S. 621 (1939), 
rehearing denied, 307 U.S. 650 (1939). 
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including Jehovah's Witnesses, to recite the Pledge on the ground that 
attendance in public schools is subject to reasonable state regulation.44 
On the same day, in Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker,45 the Supreme Court also 
denied a petition for certiorari from a California decision that upheld the 
actions of school officials who expelled a student who refused to recite 
the Pledge and salute the flag. 46 The California court found that a local 
board had the power to impose a reasonable regulation designed to 
promote the efficiency of its schools as they educate children in good 
citizenship, patriotism, and loyalty to state and nation.47 In other 
litigation not appealed to the Supreme Court, courts in Florida48 and 
New Y ork49 rejected similar challenges, while suits from Texas50 dealt 
with non-constitutional issues. At the same time, a case from 
Pennsylvania, which struck the Pledge down as unconstitutional, was 
making its inexorable way to the High Court. 51 
B. Supreme Court Cases 
The Supreme Court finally accepted a case on the merits challenging 
the constitutionality of requiring students to salute the flag in Minersville 
School District v. Gobitis (Gobitis). 52 Gobitis was filed by a Jehovah's 
Witnesses father from Pennsylvania who filed suit on his own behalf and 
on behalf of his two children.53 The father argued that requiring his 
children to salute the flag while in school, at the risk of being expelled for 
non-compliance, was the equivalent to forcing them to worship an image 
that violated their religious beliefs as reflected in the book of Exodus. 54 
44. !d. at 921. 
45. Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 82 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1938), cert denied, 306 U.S. 621 (1939). 
46. !d. at 394. 
47. Jd. 
48. St. ex rei. Bleich v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction for Hillsborough County. 190 So. 815 (Fla. 1939) 
(affirming decision upholding constitutionality of a statute requiring all children attending free 
public schools to salute the tlag). 
49. People ex ret. Fish v. Sandstrom, 279 N.Y. 523 (N.Y. jan 17, 1939) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a regulation requiring children to participate in a ceremony of saluting the flag). 
50. Reynolds v. Rayborn, 116 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (reinstating a father's custody 
of a child even though he refused to have her salute the flag); Shinn v. Barrow, 121 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1938) (dismissing an appeal of a child's suspension for refusing to salute the flag as moot 
where the school term ended). 
51. Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 21 F. Supp. 581 (E. D. Pa. 1937). 
52. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobi tis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
53. !d. at 592. 
54. More specifically, the Court noted that the Witnesses relied on Exodus 20:3-5, according 
to which: 
3. Thou shalt have no other gods before me. 4. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven 
image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or 
that is in the water under the earth. 5. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve 
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In reversing an order of the Third Circuit that affirmed an injunction in 
favor of the plaintiffs,55 the Court, in an 8-1 judgment,56 reasoned that 
the students were not free to excuse themselves from participating in the 
Pledge because it was a rational way that the state officials could use to 
teach patriotism in schools.57 The Court also recognized that 
Pennsylvania's compulsory attendance law was a legitimate legislative 
enactment, which the father would have violated by having his children 
refrain from participating in the Pledge.5H 
Controversy over the Pledge refused to subside even after Gobitis. As 
such, the Court revisited the issue of requiring students to recite the 
Pledge when Jehovah's Witnesses and others in West Virginia challenged 
the constitutionality of a revised state education board regulation enacted 
after Gobitis, which stipulated that refusal to participate in the flag salute 
could be treated as an act of insubordination leading to expulsion from 
schooP9 As in Gobitis, the plaintiffs in West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette (Barnette) 60 claimed that the salute violated the 
religious freedom rights of schoolchildren.61 After a federal trial court 
enjoined the recitation of the Pledge,62 the Court in Barnette, torn by the 
conflict between state authority and individual rights, took the unusual 
step of explicitly reversing Gobitis in a 6-3 decision.63 In its analysis, the 
Court was convinced that educational officials exceeded constitutional 
limitations on their authority by invading the sphere of intellect and 
spirit that is protected by the First Amendment, especially in light of the 
students' passive refusal to participate in the flag salute. 64 The Court 
concluded that "[t]o believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic 
ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory 
routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our 
institutions to free minds."65 Although not explicitly referring to it, it is 
them. 
Id. at 591 n. I. 
55. Gobi tis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 24 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1938), ajj"d, I 08 1'.2d 683 (3d Cir. 
1939), ccrt. granted, 309 U.S. 645 (1940). 
56. The sole dissenter was justice Stone, Minersville, 310 U.S. at 601 (Stone,)., dissenting). 
57. Id. at 599-600. 
5& ld.at 597-98. 
59. W.Va. St. Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,625-26 (1943). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 629-30. 
62. Barnette v. W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W. Va. 1942). 
63. W. Va. St. Bd. ofEduc., 319 U.S. at 642. (justices Roberts, Reed, and Frankrurtcr were the 
dissenting justices.). 
64. Id. 
65. !d. at 641. 
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hard to imagine that the Court was not influenced by the fact that as 
World War II was raging on, American and other forces fought to ensure 
freedom for peoples throughout the world.66 Although religion 
admittedly played a part in both of the cases that reached the Supreme 
Court, the words "under God" had not yet been added to the Pledge. 
Even so, there is no reason to think that the results would have been any 
different had the phrase been included at that time. 
C. Post-Barnette Litigation 
The Pledge was not re-litigated again until almost a quarter-century 
after Barnette. Moreover, as reflected in this sequential review of cases, 
the litigation involving the Pledge took on a different focus once the 
words "under God" were added. In the post-Barnette litigation, which 
concerned religious objections by Jehovah's Witnesses, later suits not 
only objected to the words "under God" on religious grounds,67 but also 
on political-free speech bases,68 culminating in challenges by atheists who 
objected to any mention of God in schools.69 
In Holden v. Board of Education/0 the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
considered whether Black Muslim children who refused to recite the 
Pledge could be excluded from public school based on their claim that 
having to join in would have violated their religious beliefs. 71 While 
others recited the pledge, the Black Muslim students stood respectfully at 
attention and were not disruptive while their classmates participated in 
the Pledge.72 Even though the students maintained that their beliefs were 
motivated as much by politics as by religion, educational officials rejected 
their claim of "conscientious scruples" since the two were intertwined 
with their racial motives.73 Although not resolving whether the students' 
refusal to salute the flag was religious or political/4 the court ordered 
66. Various opponents of the salute, including the Parent and Teachers Association, Boy and 
Cirl Scouts, and the Red Cross objected to the salute who described it " ... as 'being too much like 
Hitler's,"' a claim repudiated by the United States Flag Association. Id. at 627-28. 
67. See infra n. 70 and accompanying text (discussing post-Barnette challenge to the Pledge 
on religious grounds). 
68. See e.g. infra nn. 69, 79, 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing post-Barnette 
challenges to the pledge on political-free speech bases). 
69. See e.g. infra n. 100 and accompanying text (discussing post-Barnette challenge to the 
Pledge by athiests objecting to any mention of God in schools). 
70. Holden v. Bd. of Educ., 216 A.2d 387 (N.j. 1966). 
71. Jd. 
72. Id. at 391. 
73. Id. at 389. 
74. Id. 
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officials to reinstate the students. 75 
Smith v. Denny/6 a dispute from California, appears to have been the 
first reported case wherein plaintiffs challenged the inclusion of the 
words "under God" in the Pledge.77 In addition to dicta from the 
Supreme Court supporting the notion that the Pledge did not violate the 
First Amendment's religion clauses,78 the court favorably cited a decision 
from a federal trial court in Arizona, which declared that singing the 
National Anthem in schools was not an establishment of religion since 
the latter "is not a religious but a patriotic ceremony, intended to inspire 
devotion to and love of country."79 
Maryland's high court, in State v. Lundquist,80 and the Fifth, now 
Eleventh Circuit,81 in Banks v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade 
County, 82 struck down requirements that would have directed students 
who objected to saluting the flag to stand while their classmates did so. 83 
The case from Maryland was filed by a teacher (who was also a father) on 
the basis that he "refuse[d] to engage in a mandatory flag salute 
ceremony, not for religious reasons but because he could not 'in good 
conscience' force patriotism upon his classes."84 The teacher/father also 
"objected strongly to being forced to salute the flag because he believed 
such a requirement eliminated his right to freely express his own loyalty 
to the United States."85 In the case from Florida, a student argued that he 
had the constitutional right to refuse to stand for the Pledge and salute, 
75. Id. at 391. 
76. Smith v. Denny, 280 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1968) [hereinafter Smith]. "[N]o case litigating 
the issue of whether the reference to God in the pledge of allegiance violates the first amendment has 
been decided by the Supreme Court ... " id. at 653. 
77. !d. at 652. 
78. See id. at 653 (citing to Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n. 21 (1962) [hereinafter Engel] 
(striking down school sponsored prayer at the start of the class day. and explaining, in dicta, that: 
[N]othing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with the fact that school children 
and others are officially encouraged to express love for our country by reciting historical 
documents such as the Declaration of Independence which contain references to the Deity or 
by singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a 
Supreme Being, or with the fact that there are many manifestations in our public life of belief in 
God 
and decision at infra n. 155. 
79. !d. at 753-54 (citing Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766,774 (D. Ariz. 1963)). 
80. St. v. Lundquist, 278 A.2d 263 (Md. 1971) [hereinafter Lundquist]. 
81. In light of the growth in the Southeastern part of the United States, the Eleventh Circuit 
was created in 1981 when Congress divided it into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Pub. L No. 96-
452,94 Stat. 1994 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 41). 
82. Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Dade County, 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Ha. 1970) 
[hereinafter Banks], ajfd, 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. Unit A 1971). 
83. Lundquist, 278 A.2d 263; Banks, 314 F. Supp. 285. 
84. Lundquist, 278 A.2d at 266. 
85. !d. 
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and that his suspension violated his constitutional right of free speech 
and expression.86 In neither case had officials offered students the option 
of leaving their classrooms. 87 
Conversely, in Goetz v. Ansell,88 even where children had the choice 
of leaving a classroom or standing silently during the Pledge, the Second 
Circuit determined that school officials in New York could not discipline 
a student who objected by remaining quietly seated because of his belief 
that the United States did not provide liberty and justice for all of its 
citizens. 89 The court decided that forcing a student to stand was no more 
acceptable than having him leave the room while the Pledge was recited, 
since this might reasonably have been viewed as a punishment for not 
participating. 90 
The first two of the three cases directly involving teachers were 
decided in favor of the educators. In Russo v. Central School District No. 
1,91 a probationary teacher in New York, as a matter of conscience, 
refused to join her students in flag salute ceremonies, including the 
recitation of the Pledge, based on her belief that the words "liberty and 
justice for all" did not reflect the quality of American life. Instead, the 
teacher stood in respectful silence, with her hands at her side, and did 
nothing to prevent her students from participating in the ceremony. 92 
Although the court noted that, "we do not share her views,"93 and 
conceded that school officials have a substantial interest in maintaining 
ceremonies that support saluting the flag,94 the Second Circuit ruled that 
the teacher could not be required to join in the recitation ceremony 
because doing so would have violated her First Amendment right to 
freedom of expression, even if it was expressed by her silence.95 
Five years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in the 
absence of a live controversy, handed down a non-binding advisory 
opinion after then Governor Dukakis asked the court how they would 
rule if litigation arose over a bill dealing with the Pledge.96 In Opinion of 
the Justices to the Governor,97 the court posited that a bill designed to 
86. Banks, 314 F. Supp. at 287. 
87. Lundquist, 278 A.2d 263; Banks, 314 F. Supp. 285. 
88. Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973). 
89. !d. at 636-37. 
90. !d. at 638. 
91. Russo v. C. Sch. Dist. No. I, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972). 
92. !d. at 626. 
93. !d. at 633. 
94. !d. at 632. 
95. /d. at 634. 
96. Op. o(the ]]. to the Gov., 363 N.E.2d 251,252 (Mass. 1977). 
97. !d. at 251. 
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have public school teachers begin the first class of each day by leading 
students in a group recitation of the Pledge would have violated the First 
Amendment. 98 The court declared that the proposed law would have 
been unconstitutional because even though it did not impose criminal 
penalties against non-complying teachers, the court feared that an 
element of compulsion remained in the prospective statutory mandate.99 
In the only other case involving the merits of a claim by a teacher, 
Palmer v. Board of Education, 100 the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite 
result. The court affirmed that despite her claim that doing so conflicted 
with her religious beliefs, a kindergarten teacher in Illinois, who was a 
Jehovah's Witness, was not free to disregard the prescribed curriculum 
with regard to patriotic matters. As such, the court upheld the school 
board's dismissal of the teacher because she refused to participate in the 
Pledge, sing patriotic songs, and celebrate certain national holidays. 101 
Returning to cases focusing primarily on students, in Sherman v. 
Community Consolidated School District 21 of Wheeling Township 
(Sherman), 102 the Seventh Circuit affirmed that school officials in Illinois 
could lead the Pledge, including the words "under God," as long as 
children were free not to participate in its daily recitation. 103 The court 
rejected the claim of a father and son, both of whom were atheists, that 
the Pledge violated the child's First Amendment right to freedom of 
religion. 104 The court noted that the use of the phrase "under God" in the 
context of the secular vow of allegiance was a "patriotic or ceremonial" 
expression rather than one of religious belief. 105 To the dismay of later 
critics, such as the pro-se plaintiff in Newdow, the Court affirmed the 
earlier judgment by explicitly eschewing the seemingly ubiquitous Lemon 
test, 106 on which the trial court had relied in upholding the pledge, 107 in 
98. !d. at 255. 
99. !d. at 254. 
100. Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 ( 1980). 
101. Id. at 1274. 
102. Sherman v. Community Canso/. Sch. Dist. 21 of Welling Township, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
103. ld. at 439. 
104. !d. at 449. 
I 05. /d. at 447. 
106. Id. at 445. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) [hereinafter Lemon], the Court 
declared that: 
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed 
by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. tirst, the 
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be 
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive 
government entanglement with religion. 
Id. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted). 
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favor of Kennedy's coercion test, which had been recently enunciated in 
Lee v. Weisman (Lee). wx More specifically, the Sherman court was 
satisfied that ceremonial references to a deity in civic life cannot "be 
understood as prayer or, support for all monotheistic religions, to the 
exclusion of atheists and those who worship multiple gods." 109 
D. Newdow v. United States Congress 
The most recent controversy involving the Pledge arose in California, 
where a self-professed atheist and non-custodial father of an eight-year 
old girl, whose own petition for certiorari described himself as "an 
incredibly outstanding parent," 110 challenged both the Pledge and a board 
policy that directed students to recite it at the start of the school day. 111 
The board policy, which was enacted pursuant to a state law requiring 
officials in public elementary schools to "conduct . . . appropriate 
Even though the tlrst two parts of the increasingly unworkable Lemon test emerged in cases 
involving prayer and Bible reading in public schools in Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203 ( 1963) [hereinafter Abington] and Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239 (Md. 1962), and the 
third developed in a dispute over a charitable tax exemption, Walz v. Tax Commn. of N. Y.C., 397 
U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding New York State's practice of providing state property tax exemptions for 
church property that is used in worship services), it was widely, and perhaps inappropriately, applied 
as a one-size fits all solution in disputes involving aid to non-public schools until the Court recast it 
in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S, 203 (1997) [hereinafter Agostini] (permitting the on-site delivery of 
Title I services to children in their religiously affiliated non-public schools and modifying the Lemon 
test by reviewing only its first two parts, while recasting entanglement as one criterion in considering 
a statute's effect). for a discussion of this case, see Charles). Russo, Allan G. Osborne, Gerald M. 
Cattaro & PhilipP. DiMattia, Agostini v. Felton and the Delivery of Title I Services in Catholic Schools, 
I Catholic Educ.: A). of Inquiry and Prac. 263 (1998). Based on the Court's having ignored it in Lee 
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) [hereinafter Lee] (striking down school sponsored prayer at public 
school graduation ceremonies, in part, on the basis of coercion), and Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) [hereinafter Santa Fe] (prohibiting student-led prayer at the start of high 
school football games), it seems that Lemon is equally as tenuous in cases involving prayer and other 
expressions of belief in public schools. 
107. Shermarz v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township, 758 f. Supp. 1244, 
1247-4H (N.D. !II. 1991). 
IOH. Lee, 505 U.S. at 5H7. ("It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution 
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its 
exercise .... " I d. 591-92. "[!]in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression 
of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce." Id. at 595. "[T]he United 
States. made this a center point ... arguing that the option of not attending the graduation 
excuses any inducement or coercion .... The argument lacks all persuasion." Jd. at 596. "To say 
that a student must remain apart from the ceremony at the opening invocation and closing 
benediction is to risk compelling conformity .... "). I d. at 596. For a discussion of this case, see 
Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles ). Russo, Lee v. Weisman: The Supreme Court Pronounces the 
llcncdiction on Public School Graduation Prayers, 77 Educ. Law Rep. I 071 ( 1992). 
I()'}_ Sherman, 980 F.2d at 445. 
110. Pet. for Writ. of Ccrt. for Michael A. Newdow at 23 n. 23, Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 124 S.Ct. 
386 (2003). 
Ill. Jd. 
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patriotic exercises" at the beginning of the school day, and that "[t]he 
giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of 
America shall satisfy such requirements," 112 did not compel children to 
join in reciting the Pledge. 113 
At the outset of the litigation, the father, Michael A. Newdow, did 
not inform the child's mother that he was acting, even though she had 
sole custody of their child and " ... the custody order require[d] both 
parents to consult on any substantial decision regarding their daughter's 
education .... "114 Moreover, the child's mother, Sandra L. Banning, 
reported that neither she, nor her daughter, was troubled by the child's 
recitation the Pledge. 115 The father's claim raised two primary challenges. 
First, he claimed that his daughter was injured by being "compelled to 
'watch and listen as her state-employed teacher in her state-run school 
leads her classmates in a ritual proclaiming that there is a God."' 116 
Second, he then argued that he had standing as a taxpayer to challenge 
the Pledge policyl 17 on the ground that federal and state moneys were 
used to enforce it. 118 
A federal trial court in California, in an unpublished opinion 
accepting the recommendation of a magistrate judge that the Pledge was 
constitutional, dismissed Newdow I for failure to state a (federal) claim; 
the court did not act on Newdow's state claims. 119 Upon further review, a 
divided Ninth Circuit reversed in favor of Newdow. 120 After deciding 
that the plaintiff had standing, the Ninth Circuit struck down both the 
1954 statute, which added the words "under God" to the Pledge, and the 
board policy authorizing its daily recitation. 121 Rejecting Congressional 
disclaimers of a religious purpose in revising the Pledge, the court held 
that both the statute and the policy violated the Establishment Clause 
insofar as teachers had to begin each school day by having students recite 
the words "under God." 122 In the face of swift and stinging criticism, 123 a 
112. Cal. Educ. Code§ 52720 (2003). 
113. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 482-83. 
114. Br. for Sandra L. Banning in Support of the Petitions for Cert. at 3-4, Newdow v. U.S. 
Cong., 124 S. Ct. 860, 124 S.Ct. 383, 124 S.Ct. 384, 2003 WL 23055033. 
115. Out From Under God, Newsweek 12 (Aug. 19, 2002). 
116. New dow II, 328 F.3d at 483. 
117. Newdow's petition, supra n. 110 at 6. 
118. At the same time, the court did not address the father's claim that the policy violated the 
state constitution. 
119. Newdow v. U.S. Con g., 2000 E. D. Cal. LEXIS 22366 (July 21, 2000). 
120. Newdow II, 328 F.3d 466. 
121. Id. at 490. 
122. Id. 
123. See e.g. hedric U. Dicker, Vincent Morris & Brad Hunter, God-Awful: Holy War as Court 
Outlaws Pledge, N.Y. Post 1 (June 27, 2002); RobertS. Greenberger, Appeals Court Strikes Down The 
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day later the court stayed its judgment. 124 The court subsequently 
rejected motions that Congress 125 and the child's mother be permitted to 
intervene in the litigation. 126 
After the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, refused over the dissent of 
six judges 127 to re-examine Newdow I, the same initial panel of judges, 
again by a 2-1 margin, struck the Pledge down. 12K This time, however, 
the court focused on the narrower ground that "the school district policy 
impermissibly coerces a religious act," 129 while refusing to address the 
constitutionality of the federal statute that authorized the Pledge. 130 In its 
analysis, the court rejected the notion that the Pledge was a patriotic 
exercise, a form of "civic deism." 131 Further, in a significant procedural 
matter, the court essentially glossed over Newdow's standing, almost 
summarily asserting he could proceed even though, as noted, the child's 
mother, whom the court inexplicably refused to permit to intervene, 
claimed that her daughter did not suffer any harm. 132 
Dissatisfied with the Ninth Circuit's second ruling, both the school 
board and the father sought further review. 133 The board appealed both 
in defending the constitutionality of its policy and in challenging the 
father's standing to bring the case. 134 As with the earlier rounds of 
litigation, the father appealed because he was dissatisfied that he did not 
receive the full relief he sought by declaring that Congress violated the 
Establishment Clause by including the words "under God" in the Pledge, 
and because he did not think that his right to standing was addressed 
satisfactorily. 135 
Pledge of Allegiance, The Wall Street ). A4 (June 27, 2002); Frank ). Murray, Pledge of Allegiance 
Ruled Unconstitutional-Democrats and Republicans Denounce Appeals, Washington Times, Panel 
Decision A01 (June 27, 2002); Insult to All Ninth Circuit Kills Pledge of Allegiance, The San Diego 
Union-Tribune B 12:7; B 8:1; B 14:2,6 (june 27, 2002). 
124. Newdow I, 292 F.3d 597. 
125. Newdow, 313 F.3d at 500. 
126. I d. at 506. 
127. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 471. 
128. I d. at 490. 
129. I d. at 487. 
130. I d. at 490. 
131. I d. at 487. 
132. Out From Under God, supra n. 115. 
133. For an article on how life in the district has been affected by the litigation, see Carline 
Hendry, Pledge Debate Taken to Hear in Calif. Dist., Educ. Week 1, 24-26 (Mar. 3, 2004). 
134. Supra n. 28, at 5-6. 
135. Newdow's petition, supra n. 110 at 7-8. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Prolegomena 
In light of Congressional threats to intervene should the High Court 
affirm the earlier order striking this modification down as 
unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit, perhaps aided and abetted by the 
Supreme Court, has placed the Nation on the precipice of a 
constitutional controversy, if not crisis, over the appropriateness of 
including the words "under God" in the Pledge. 136 Thus, by agreeing to 
hear an appeal in Newdow, the Court has joined the latest battle in the 
ongoing culture war in a dispute focusing on religion, values, and even 
diversity in American schools and society. 
Before engaging in substantive analyses of the issues, preliminary 
reflections on the place of religion in public education are in order. 
While it almost goes without saying that religion is, and should remain, 
primarily a concern of parents rather than educators in public schools, 
one can only wonder what is gained when the courts leave no choice but 
to exclude many religious activities from schools or run the risk of 
litigation. 137 Put another way, although the debate is often framed as not 
wanting values, especially religious values to dominate in public schools, 
it is at best disingenuous, and at worst dishonest, to make this the central 
issue. Instead, since educators teach values every day, for example, by 
instructing students not to cheat and to respect others, the debate should 
be more accurately framed as a clash of cultures over whose values 
should prevail in schools. 
The core of this debate rests on the paradox of how a democratic 
society that was established largely in pursuit of religious freedom can 
safeguard the rights of both the majority and minority. In other words, 
as the most highly religious country among wealthy western nations, ux 
136. See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
137. See e.g. Sechler v. St. College Area Sch. Dist. 121 F. Supp. 2d 439 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (refming 
to permit a suit by a youth minister, challenging a school's practice of permitting a display that 
included information on Chanukah and Kwanza, but nothing on Christmas, to proceed); Walz ex 
ref. Walz v. Egg Harbor Township Bd. of Educ., 342 f.3d 271 (3d C:ir. 2003) (affirming that ,, 
restriction of distribution of proselytizing pencils and evangelical candy canes to outside classroom 
and after school hours did not violate the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and free 
exercise of religion); but see Westfield High Sch. L.l.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 'JH 
(D. Mass. 2003) (enjoining board speech policies prohibiting students from distributing such candy 
canes and religious literature during non-instructional time). 
138. Among Wealthy Nations ... U.S. Stands Alone in its Embrace of Religion, The Pew (;lolwl 
Attitudes Project <http:/ /people-press.org/reports/display.phpVReportlD= 167> (I lee. 19, 2002) 
(reporting that in a survey of forty-four Nations, 59 percent of Americans responded that religion 
plays a very important role in their lives; by contrast, 33 percent of respondents in (;real Britain, 30 
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while few Americans seem to be troubled by including the words "under 
God" in the Pledge, 139 it is worth remembering that constitutional rights 
are not subject to the ballot box or public opinion. As such, it is 
important to safeguard the rights of the minority. Yet, as tensions flare 
when in protecting the rights of increasingly vocal secularist opponents 
of religion, the judiciary has not steered a clear path in avoiding what can 
best be described as a tyranny of the minority, often led by various public 
interest groups140 exercising a kind of "heckler's veto," 141 which allows a 
small group to drown out the wishes of the majority. 
Amid debate over religion and inconsistent judicial messages, one 
can only wonder how educators can expect to foster their espoused 
appreciation for diversity in all of its manifestations if they are unwilling 
to tolerate expressions of religious beliefs that might not be shared by all 
members of a school community. 142 It is ironic that in a nation that 
claims to value religious freedom, the courts have not only been unable 
to reach a consensus on the appropriateness of religious activities in 
schools, but, as noted, have arguably taken impermissible steps to remove 
just about all school-sponsored references to religion from schools, 
however tenuous their connections to establishment may be. Clearly, as 
the Supreme Court prepares to consider the constitutionality of the 
words "under God" in the Pledge, the Justices must find a middle ground 
percent in Canada, 21 percent in Germany, and II percent in France gave the same answer). 
139. See e.g. NYers Favor God and Old Glory, N.Y. Post 6 (Oct. 25, 2003) (reporting that 81 
percent of New Yorkers approve keeping "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance); Russ Oates, AP 
Online Survey: Support for First Amendment Up (Aug. I, 2003) (reporting that 68 percent of 
respondents did not think that the inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge violated the First 
Amendment); The Washington Post In Brief, Wash. Post B9 (June 14, 2003) (reporting that 89 
percent of respondents in a poll by Quinnipiac University in Connecticut support keeping the phrase 
"under God" in the Pledge); U.S. Newswire, (Mar. 20, 2003) (reporting that 59 percent of high school 
students were offended by someone who refused to stand during the Pledge). 
140. Perhaps the most widely recognized group in this regard is the American Civil Liberties 
Union. Sec e.g., County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U. Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) 
[hereinafter Allegheny]. See infra n. 169 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. 
141. Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 118 (2001) [hereinafter Good News] 
(permitting a religious group to use public school facilities). In Good News Club, justice Thomas 
made this point in warning that the Court is unwilling "to employ Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence using a modified heckler's veto. in which a group's religious activity can be proscribed 
on the basis of what ... members of the audience might misperceive." I d. For a discussion of this 
case see Charles). Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, And the Wall Keeps Tumbling Down: The Supreme 
Court Upholds Religious Liberty in Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., !57 Educ. L. Rep. 1-14. (2001). 
142. A recent case from Michigan highlighted this conundrum. See Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. 
Schs., 2003 WL 22912029, I (E.D. Mich. 2003) (In ruling that school officials violated a student's 
rights, a federal trial court judge acerbically wrote that "[t]his case presents the ironic, and 
unfortunate, paradox of a public high school celebrating 'diversity' by refusing to permit the 
presentation to students of an 'unwelcomed' viewpoint on the topic of homosexuality and religion, 
while actively promoting the competing view."). I d. 
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that can accommodate the perspectives of all Americans. 
B. Divining the Outcome in Newdow 143 
As it goes about the challenging task of reviewing the status of the 
Pledge, the Court clearly set forth the two questions that it is set to 
consider: 
l. Whether respondent has standing to challenge as unconstitutional a 
public school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing 
students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. 2. Whether a public 
school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in 
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes the words 'under 
God,' violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as 
applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment .... 144 
As with most educational disputes that have reached it, 145 especially 
with regard to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 146 the 
Supreme Court is overtly polarized into three distinct camps. At one end 
are the accommodationists/strict constructionists-Chief Justice 
Rehnquist 147 and Justices Scalia148 and Thomas. 149 These Justices typically 
143. An imprecise science at best, patterns tend to reflect how the justices tend to vote. For 
example, a recent study reported that in a mathematical analysis of patterns over the past eight years, 
covering 468 cases, justices Scalia and Thomas voted together more than 93 percent of the time while 
justices <.linsburg and Souter voted the same way more than 90 percent of the time. See Erica 
Klarrcich, Ideal justice, Sci. News (June 28, 2003); jack Kilpatrick, justices [D]on't [F]it into 
[P]redictable [J]deological [B/oxes, Deseret News A9 (Aug. 4, 2003). An earlier story, Daniel E. Troy, 
The Court's Mr. Right, Nat!. Rev. 39-41 (Aug. 9, 1999), reported that during justice Thomas' first five 
years on the High Court, he and justice Scalia voted together 80 percent of the time, justices Breyer 
and Souter voted together 84 percent of the time, and justices Ginsberg and Souter voted together 80 
percent of the time. 
144. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384,384 (Mem) (2003). 
145. In addition to the religion cases highlighted throughout, and aid cases that are excluded 
from this discussion. See e.g. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822 (2002), on remand, 300 F.3d 1222 (lOth Cir. 2002) (upholding by a 5-4 margin, drug-testing 
of students involved in extra-curricular activities); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), and 
Gratz v. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (by margins of S-4 and 6-3, respectively, upholding the 
University of Michigan's affirmative action admissions policy in its law school while striking down 
its reliance on a point system in admissions to undergraduate programs). 
146. For a discussion ofrelated issues, see Charles). Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Supreme 
Court and the Establishment Clause at the Dawn of the New Millennium: 'Bristl[ing/ with Hostility to 
All Things Religious' or Necessary Separation of Church and State?, 2001 BYU Educ. & L.j. 231. 
147. Since joining the Court, Chief justice Rehnquist has typically voted in favor of religious 
freedom in educational settings. See e.g. Widmar v. i!incent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (upholding access 
by a Christian group to use school facilities in a university setting); Wallace v. faffrce, 472 U.S. 3H 
(1985) [hereinafter Wallace] (striking down a statute from Alabama that authorized a daily period of 
silence in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer as an endorsement of religion) 
(Rehnquist, )., dissenting); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) [hereinafter Edwards] (striking 
down a statute that prohibited the teaching of "evolution-science" in public schools unless 
accompanied by instruction on "creation-science") (Rehnquist, )., dissenting); Bd. of Educ. of 
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interpret the Constitution as not requiring an absolute "separation of 
church and state" -language that does not appear in the text of the 
Constitution. They have consistently voted in favor of religious freedom 
in terms of permitting religious activity in public schools. However, as 
discussed below, Justice Scalia's self-recusal in Newdow makes it all the 
more difficult in attempting to divine the outcome if the Court addresses 
the case on its merits. 150 As an accommodationist, Justice Scalia would 
likely have joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas in 
upholding the Pledge. These members of the Court are likely to agree 
that the words "under God" are more of an expression of America's 
religious heritage, often referred to as "civic deism," than an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion. 
On the other hand, demonstrating talisman-like obeisance for the 
tired, if not failed, Jeffersonian metaphor mandating the "building a wall 
of separation between church and state,"151 a phrase that is not found in 
the text of the Constitution, the separationists on the Court, Justices 
Stevens, 152 Souter, 153 and Ginsburg/ 54 have consistently voted to exclude 
Westside Community Sch .. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) [hereinafter Mergens] (upholding the 
Equal Access Act); Lee, 505 U.S. 577; (Rehnquist, C.)., dissenting); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. MPriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) [hereinafter Lamb's Chapel] (granting a religious group 
access to use public school facilities); on remand, 17 F.3d 1425 (2d Cir. 1994); Santa Fe, 5}0 U.S. 290; 
Good News, 533 U.S. 98. 
148. justice Scalia has also upheld religious freedoms in school settings. See e .. g. Edwards, 482 
U.S. 578; Mergens, 496 U.S. 226; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384; Lee, 505 U.S. 577; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 
290; Good News, 533 U.S. 98. 
149. See e.g. Lee, 505 U.S. 577; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290; Lambs Chapel, 508 U.S. 384; Good News, 
533 U.S. 98. 
150. For a similar reflection on the outcome, without making a final prediction, sec Bill W. 
Sanford, Jr., Separation v. Patriotism: Expelling the Pledge from School, 34 St. Mary's L.]. 461 (2003). 
151. The metaphor of the "wall of separation" comes from Thomas jefferson's letter of]an. 1, 
1802 to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins & StephenS. Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury 
Baptist Association. Thomas jefferson, Writings of Thomas Jefferson vol. 16, 281 (Andrew Ellery 
Bergh ed. The Thomas jefferson Memorial Assn. 1903). jefferson wrote: 
I d. 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his (;od ... I 
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared 
that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and state. 
The Supreme Court first used the term in Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) (rejecting a hce 
Exercise Clause challenge to a federal polygamy statute). 
152. Since joining the Court, justice Stevens voted against permitting prayer or religious 
activity in public schools in all but two cases, both of which involved access to educational facilities. 
See Widmar, 454 U.S. 263; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384. In all other instances, he voted against 
religious liberty. See Wallace, 472 U.S. 38; Edwards, 482 U.S. 578; Mergens, 496 U.S. 226; Lee, 505 
U.S. 577; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290; Good News, 533 U.S. 98. 
153. During his time on the Court, justice Souter voted against religious activity in the three 
cases in which he participated. See Lee, 505 U.S. 577; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290; Good News, 531 U.S. 'IS. 
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religion, whether in the form of aid or activity, in public schools. Based 
on their individual and bloc votes, it is safe to say that they are likely to 
strike the Pledge down. These Justices' reliance on Jefferson's "wall" 
metaphor has led Justice Stevens, for example, to reveal a deep-seated 
animosity toward religion in any case, as he has voiced his almost 
paranoid fear that providing poor children in failing urban schools with 
vouchers might turn the United States into a nation that engages in the 
same misuse of religion that occurs in parts of the world that are replete 
with ethnic-religious strife. 155 
The views of the remaining three Justices, Kennedy, O'Connor, and 
Breyer, are somewhat in doubt. Their votes in Newdow will likely depend 
on whether they are willing to treat the words "under God" in the Pledge 
as what is euphemistically described as "civic deism" rather than the 
unconstitutional establishment of religion. Under civic deism, 
"references to God [such as that] contained in the Pledge of 
Allegiance ... [are] protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly 
because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious 
content."156 Thus, it remains to be seen whether these Justices will be 
willing to acknowledge that "civic deism" recognizes that although the 
Pledge contains the words "under God," it has not had a tendency to 
establish a state religion or suppress the beliefs of minority groups since 
religious freedom is such an integral part of the American consciousness, 
a position that the Court has reflected in dicta. 157 As such, the key 
question for Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, in particular, is whether 
the words "under God" in the Pledge should be treated differently from 
other forms of religious expression such as prayer. 
Although he has typically been more of a separationist, Justice 
Breyer's having partially joined both the majority and concurrence in 
permitting a religious club to meet in a public school suggests that he 
154. During her time on the High Court, justice Ginsberg also opposed religious activity in the 
cases in which she was involved, Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 577; Good News, 533 U.S. 98. 
155. In Zelman v. Sirnrnons-1-Iarris, justice Stevens wrote, "I have been influenced by my 
understanding of the impact of religious strife on the decisions of our forbear[or]s to migrate to this 
continent, and on the decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle btst 
to mistrust one another." 536 U.S. 639,686 (2002) (Stevens, j., dissenting). 
156. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) [hereinafter Lynch] (Brennan,)., dissenting); 
sec also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (upholding prayer at the start of legidative 
sessions based on the recognition that "[t]o invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with 
making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an 'establishment' of religion or a step toward 
establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of 
this country"). 
157. Smith, 280 r. Supp. at 653 (citing support for the concept of civic deity as not violating the 
Establishment Clause). For examples of two noted separationists, see justice Black in Engel, 370 U.S. 
421, and justice Brennan in Abington, 374 U.S. 203. 
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may join Justices O'Connor and Kennedy as a swing vote. 15H Justices 
O'Connor109 and Kennedi 60 typically have the greatest impact on cases 
involving religion in the market place of ideas, including public schools. 
They have reached mixed results in this crucial area, however, voting to 
permit access to public school facilities, but placing limits on religious 
activities involving prayer in public schools. Perhaps the best example of 
Justice O'Connor's influence in the important arena of religion is a far-
reaching non-school case, Lynch v. Donnelly (Lynch). 161 In Lynch, the 
Court permitted the placement of a Christmas display including Santa's 
house, a Christmas tree, and a Nativity scene on public property. 162 In 
her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor enunciated her "endorsement 
test." Under this test, Justice O'Connor wrote in a concurring opinion 
that "[e]ndorsement sends a message to non-adherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite 
message." 161 She added that "irrespective of government's actual 
purpose, [ ifl the practice under review in fact conveys a message of 
endorsement or disapproval ... [a court] should render the challenged 
practice invalid." 164 Relying on this test, Justice Stevens' opinion in Santa 
Fe Independent School District v. Doe 165 struck down prayer before high 
school football games in part based on his assertion that school officials 
appeared to endorse religion. 166 
15il. Sc< e.g. Good News, 533 U.S. 98. Although it is beyond the scope of the analysis in this 
article, justice Breyer also demonstrated an openness to religious freedom by joining justice 
O'Connor's concurrence in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 836 (2000) (O'Connor, ]., concurring) 
(upholding the constitutionality of Chapter 2 of Title I, now Title VI, of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, a far-reaching federal law permitting the loan of instructional materials 
including library books, computers, television sets, tape recorders, and maps, to non-public schools). 
For a discussion of this article see Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles ]. Russo, Religious Schools and 
Government Assistance: What is Acceptable After Helms? lSI Educ. L. Rep. 373 (20(ll). 
159. justice O'Connor voted in favor of religious freedom in Mergens, 496 U.S. 226; Good 
News, 533 U.S. 'Jil; but see Wallace, 472 U.S. at 67 (O'Connor,]., concurring); Edwards, 482 U.S. 578; 
Lee, 505 U.S. 577; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290. 
160. justice Kennedy voted in favor of religious freedom in Mergens, 496 U.S. 226; Lamb's 
Chapel, 508 U.S. 384, Good News, 533 U.S. 98; but see Lee, 505 U.S. 577; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290. 
161. Lynch, 465 U.S. 66il. 
162. !d. at 6il<i. 
163. !d. at 687-88 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
IM. !d. at 6'!0 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
165. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290. for a discussion of Santa Fe, see Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles]. 
Rmso, Student Choice and School District Prayers: What is Constitutionally Acceptable?, !51 Educ. 1.. 
Rep. 37'! (20()) ). 
JG6. /d.at31H. 
322 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2004 
A year later, in her concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 167 
wherein the Court struck down a mandatory moment of silence for 
meditation or voluntary prayer, Justice O'Connor adopted an approach 
that can arguably be viewed as being at odds with her opinion in Lynch, 
where she rejected the claim that the holding would render the Pledge 
unconstitutional because Congress amended it in 1954 to add the words 
"under God." She continued to write that, "In my view, the words 'under 
God' in the Pledge ... serve as an acknowledgment of religion with 'the 
legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, [and] 
expressing confidence in the future."' 168 
Optimism that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy might uphold the 
Pledge must be tempered by the attitudes they displayed with regard to 
"civic deism" in non-school settings in County of Allegheny v. American 
Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter (Allegheny). 169 Unlike 
the mixed positions that these two Justices have adopted with regard to 
other aspects of religion in public schools, as discussed below, their 
positions in Allegheny do not, at first glance, appear to bode well for the 
Pledge. 
In Allegheny, the Court struck down the display of a creche on public 
property as violating the Establishment Clause. 170 At the same time, the 
Court permitted a display consisting of a menorah, a Christmas tree, and 
a sign about religious freedom to remain on public property insofar as it 
concluded that these did not have the unconstitutional effect of 
advancing religion. 171 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor applied the 
endorsement test in discussing ceremonial deism in the form of 
legislative prayers or statements at the opening of judicial sessions, which 
mention God. 172 She commented that "examples of ceremonial deism do 
not survive Establishment Clause scrutiny simply by virtue of their 
historical longevity alone.'' 173 Rather, insofar as she declared that 
ceremonial deism would still have to pass muster under her endorsement 
test, it is doubtful whether the Pledge would survive Justice O'Connor's 
scrutiny. 
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Allegheny echoed Justice O'Connor's 
sentiment. In discussing the Pledge's use of the words "under God," he 
stated that while "no one is obligated to recite the phrase ... it borders on 
167. Wallace, 472 U.S. 38. 
168. Id. at 78 n. 5 (1985) (O'Connor,)., concurring). 
169. Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573. 
170. Id. 601-02. 
171. Id. at 621. 
172. Id. at 631 (O'Connor,)., concurring). 
173. Id. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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sophistry to suggest that the 'reasonable' atheist would not feel less than a 
'full member of the political community' every time his fellow Americans 
recited, as part of their expression of patriotism and love for country, a 
phrase he believed to be false." 174 
Returning to school cases, it is worth observing that Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy have reached mixed results with regard to 
religious activity in public school settings. For example, in Lee v. 
Weisman 175 Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion, joined by 
Justice O'Connor, in striking down school sponsored graduation prayer 
on the ground that students were coerced to participate in such 
ceremonies. 176 The Ninth Circuit echoed this language in Newdow II. 177 
Further, both Justices joined the Court's majority in Santa Fe, wherein 
the Court, in an opinion by arch-separationist Justice Stevens that relied 
in part on Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, m struck down student-
led prayer before a high school football game. 179 On the other hand, both 
Justices joined the majority in Good News Club v. Milford Central 
School, 180 wherein the Court upheld the right of a Christian club to meet 
in public school facilities after hours since secular based groups had 
access to do the same. 181 
Should Justice O'Connor strictly apply her endorsement test, there is 
some chance that she could tip the scales in favor of the separationists, 
regardless of how Justice Kennedy rules, depending on whether she is 
satisfied that the Pledge is neutral. Additionally, apart from how Justice 
O'Connor decides, Kennedy's dissent in Allegheny suggests that he, too, 
could be convinced to side with the separationists. The key question in 
this regard is whether Justices O'Connor and Kennedy can be swayed by 
sentiment, such as that expressed by Judge Fernandez in his Newdow I 
dissent, wherein he presciently questioned whether the two judge 
majority sought to "cool the febrile nerves of a few [opponents of the 
Pledge] at the cost of removing the healthy glow conferred upon the 
many citizens when the forbidden verses, or phrases, are uttered, read, or 
seen[,]" 1H2 and stop short of striking down the Pledge. 
In sum, Justice O'Connor appears to be most concerned that the 
174. I d. at 673 (Kennedy,)., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
175. Lee, 505 U.S. 577. 
176. /d. at 599. 
177. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 486. 
178. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 310-12. 
179. Id. at 313. 
180. Good News, 533 U.S. 98. 
!HI. /d. 
182. Newdow /, 292 F.3d at 615. 
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government not endorse a religious act and that it maintain neutrality in 
the same regard. Concomitantly, Justice Kennedy's greatest concern 
about religion in public schools seems to focus on whether governmental 
coercion is present. Clearly, the Pledge policy at issue in Newdow II 
involves neither of these two elements that raise concerns for Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy. As such, in light of their generally centrist 
views, 183 despite their having raised some concerns about the place of 
"civic deism" and religious activity in schools, it is likely that Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy will join Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas in upholding the Pledge. Thus assuring at least a plurality, the 
Court will again repudiate the Ninth Circuit184 rather than run the risk of 
tearing apart the American fabric by striking down the words "under 
God" in the Pledge. Further, given the openness that he has displayed 
toward religion in his most recent cases, there is reason for cautious 
optimism that Justice Kennedy will not join the separationists, Justices 
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, who will likely call for the removal of the 
words "under God." Even if Justice Breyer joins his colleagues in 
upholding the Pledge, the Ninth Circuit may well have set off a firestorm 
that may lead Congress significantly to reform the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. 
C. f ustice Scalia's Recusa l 
Perhaps the most interesting twist in light of the Court's agreement 
to review Newdow 185 is that Justice Scalia has recused himself. While 
Scalia did not explain why he would not participate, the brief for the pro-
se plaintiff, a medical doctor with a law degree, requested that Scalia do 
so in response to a speech that he delivered in January 2003. 186 Speaking 
at a Religious Freedom Day Rally in Fredericksburg, Virginia, in January 
2003, Justice Scalia, although conceding that the Ninth Circuit had "some 
plausible support"187 from Supreme Court precedent in reaching its 
183. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (striking down, in a majority opinion 
written by justice Kennedy, a statute that made it illegal for two persons of the same sex to engage in 
certain intimate sexual conduct as applied to adult males who engaged in consensual act of sodomy 
in the privacy of home). justice O'Connor concurred with Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in a 
6-3 decision. Id. at 2484 (O'Connor, j., concurring). 
184. See Arthur D. Hellman, Getting it Right: Panel Error and the En Bane Process in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 425 (Winter 2000) (discussing the Supreme Court 
and the Ninth Circuit); see also Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals en 
Banes, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 17 (2001). 
185. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 860 (Mem), 861 (2003). 
186. Pet. for Writ. of Cert. for Michael A. Newdow, Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 124 S.Ct. 386 
(2003). 
187. Mark Walsh, Scalia: Courts go too far on Church State, Educ. Week 22 (Jan. 22, 2003); 
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judgment, suggested that this was a matter better left to legislative, rather 
than judicial, action. He also spoke in support of prayer in school. 1 ~8 
Months earlier, House Majority Leader, Representative Tom DeLay of 
Texas, and others, suggested that Congress, relying on its authority under 
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, could remove matters relating 
to the Pledge from the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary if the Court 
refuses to overturn the Ninth Circuit's judgment. 
Justice Scalia's public criticisms of the Ninth Circuit's controversial 
ruling were arguably imprudent since he addressed a matter that could 
plausibly have come before the Court. 189 Notwithstanding, Scalia's 
speech was in character with his own well-known jurisprudential 
perspectives in support of religious freedom. Moreover, since it is no 
secret that Scalia is an accommodationist who does not fear that religious 
activities in schools might lead to the establishment of religion, his 
recusal may well have been unnecessary but for his personal integrity. 
But for his personal integrity, it is perplexing that Justice Scalia 
would recuse himself, given that other members of the Court who have 
also spoken out on matters that could have come before them have not 
recused themselves in the past. It should be conceded, however, that the 
parties in those cases did not raise the issue like the plaintiff in 
Newdow. 19° For example, Justice O'Connor voiced skepticism about the 
death penalty without addressing a particular case in a speech that she 
delivered in July 2001. 191 Yet, almost a year later, she and Justice 
Ginsburg joined the Court's opinion that executions of mentally retarded 
criminals were "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment. 192 Four months earlier, while speaking in Maryland, 
Justice [D}ecries [C]ourts [R]emoval of God, Houston Chron. 5 (Jan. 13, 2003). 
IH8. Walsh, Educ. Week 22 (Jan. 22, 2003). 
18'!. Scalia was probably acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(a), according to which, "[a]ny 
justice, judge, or [magistrate judge] of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in 
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Further, Canon 3(A)6 of the Code of 
Conduct for United States, under the heading Adjudicative Responsibilities, reads: 
A judge should avoid public comment on the merits of a pending or impending action, 
requiring similar restraint by court personnel subject to the judge's direction and control. This 
proscription does not extend to public statements made in the course of the judge's otiicial 
duties, to the explanation of court procedures, or to a scholarly presentation made for purposes 
of legal education. 
175 F.R.D. 363. 
190. For a very brief discussion of some of these issues, see Charles ). Russo & Ralph D. 
Mawdsley, Pledge Case Recusal Reveals Double Standard in Supreme Court, 33 No. 22 Your Sch. and 
the L. 1, 4 (2003). 
191. See Charles Lane, O'Connor Expresses Death Penalty Doubt; Justice Says Innocent May Be 
Killed, The Washington Post AI (July 4, 2001). 
192. Atkins v. Va, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). justices O'Connor and Ginsburg also joined the 
majority in Kelly v. S.C., 534 U.S. 246 (2002), wherein the Court held that a criminal defendant was 
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Justice Ginsburg, who joined the same opinion, had called for a 
moratorium on the death penalty. 193 Further, in a related development, 
there was no outcry when Ginsburg, while speaking in Australia, 
arrogantly leveled a personal criticism at Congressman Tom DeLay, a 
leader in the legislative action supporting the Pledge, by mocking his 
having been an exterminator, not a lawyer, before becoming a legislator, 
as she disagreed with his correct observation that the Constitution 
permits the impeachment of federal judges who abuse their powers. 194 
If one is concerned about Scalia's judicial impartiality for speaking 
out on a matter of public concern, one can wonder what questions can be 
raised over the death penalty issue or, more on point, about Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, who, as noted, have consistently espoused 
strict-separationist views. Thus, the fact that Scalia criticized a highly 
controversial case in a speech under the broad rubric of religious 
freedom should not be a sufficient reason to request a recusal absent 
specific proof of a lack of impartiality when similar standards have not 
been applied to other members of the Court. 
D. Reflections 
Two initial issues merit some consideration. First, it is hard to know 
why the Court has agreed to allow Newdow to argue his own case. 195 
This unusual action is perplexing not only because the plaintiff lacks the 
requisite three years of practice, but also because he has never before 
argued a case.196 Given his apparently contentious personality, the father 
would likely cry "foul" in the event that he is unsuccessful at the Supreme 
Court. 
entitled to a jury instruction that the alternative to the death penalty is a life sentence without parole. 
193. See e.g. Note, Smashing the Tragic Illusion of Justice: The Reprehensibility of the Death 
Penalty in Virginia, 41 Cath. L. 255, 260 n. 18 (2002). 
194. For the relevant portion of justice Ginsburg's speech, see Jay Nordlinger, Undies to the 
[M}aid, [K]nocking the [O}ld [E]xterminator, Castro and the Red Sox - and [Mfore, Natl. Rev. 
Online <http:/ /www.nationalreview.com/impromptus/impromptus200310170904.asp> (Oct. 17, 
2003) ("The most egregious instance was Ruth Bader Ginsburg's mockery of DeLay-on foreign soil. 
She was in Australia when she ridiculed a point that DeLay had made-perfectly correct-namely, 
that the Constitution allows for the impeachment of judges who abuse their powers. She said, 'Mr. 
DeLay is not a lawyer but, I am told, an exterminator by profession.' This provoked great yuks in the 
house."). 
195. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 860 (mem) (2003); see also Bob Egelko, 
Atheist Dad Is Allowed to Argue Pledge Case I Justices Reviewing 'under Gd.' The S.F. Chron. A19 
(Dec. 2, 2003); Howard Mintz, Pledge-[B]an [Bjacker to [R]eprescnt [H]imseif: Sacramento Dad to 
Face U.S. Supreme Court, San jose Mercury 6 (Dec. 2, 2003). 
196. According to the Supreme Court's Rule 5.1, "[t]o qualify for admission to the Bar of this 
Court, an applicant must have been admitted to practice ... for a period of at least three years 
immediately before the date of application .... "USCS S. Ct. R. 5 (2003). 
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The second initial concern focuses on the Court's agreement to hear 
oral arguments on the question of the father's standing. That is, the 
Court must examine whether the father's claim can proceed since, when 
the litigation began, he had neither custody, nor the shared the custody 
that he now has, of his daughter. 197 While the Court could rely on this 
procedural, rather than substantive, means to dispose of the case, such a 
resolution is unlikely since in doing so the constitutionality of the words 
"under God" would remain in doubt in light of the split between the 
Circuits. Further, as strident as the father is in his opposition to religion 
in general, and not just to the Pledge, if the Court were to address the 
merits of his claim, res judicata would effectively preclude any attempt 
on Newdow's part tore-litigate the controversy. 
Placing aside attempts to divine how individual Justices might rule in 
a case that appears too close to call, the Court needs to be mindful of two 
important matters in reaching its judgment. First, as suggested earlier, 
the Justices must consider whether the Pledge is, in fact, an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion or whether it is a form of 
ceremonial deism-an expression of America's deeply, long held belief in 
God. 1n In reaching its conclusion, the Court is likely to consider the 
various Establishment Clause tests that it has enunciated over the years. 
However, insofar as the Lemon test has fallen increasingly out of favor, 
the Court is likely to turn to either Justice O'Connor's endorsement 
standard and/or to Justice Kennedy's coercion test. Under either of these 
tests, as discussed above, a majority, or at least a plurality, of the Justices 
can place their ideological biases aside and permit the Pledge to 
withstand constitutional muster. 
The Justices must also examine the impact that striking down the 
Pledge might have on American public schools and society as a whole. 
Put another way, it is possible that the public would lose respect for the 
Court as an institution if it were to vitiate the Pledge. Further, if judicial 
ideologues who find an impermissible governmental establishment of 
religion in such matters as the words "under God" in the Pledge, 
continue to impose their wills on the American people, then perhaps 
Congressional leaders will make good on their promise to restrict the 
authority of the federal courts in matters of religion, thereby setting off a 
potentially divisive constitutional crisis, 199 not only over the words 
197. See Tony Mauro, Court Watch: Pledge Case: New Twist Alters Outlook High Court Nears 
Decision on Review Of 'under God' Suits, 26 No., 38 Legal Times (Sept. 22, 2003). 
198. For a brief discussion of the role of religion in American history, see Br. of the U.S. as 
Respt. Supporting Petrs. at 20-26, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct 860 (2003) 
(available in 2003 WI. 23051994). 
19lJ. Sec e.g. U. S. Cong., An Act to reaffirm the reference to one Nation Under God in the 
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"under God," but also over the scope congressional authority to act. 21H1 
Unhappy with the Ninth's Circuit's rulings, federal legislators have 
already proposed ways of blunting its action. A Washington Times news 
article, for example, reported that House Majority Leader, Representative 
Tom DeLay of Texas, suggested that Congress, relying on its authority 
under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, could remove matters 
relating to the Pledge from the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary if the 
Supreme Court refuses to overturn Newdow Il.201 This same news story 
also reported that two days earlier, the Senate had voted 94-0 in a 
resolution supporting the current wording of the Pledge, just as, during 
the summer of 2002, the House had adopted a similar resolution by a 
vote of 416-3, with 11 members voting present. 202 More recently, 
Republican Congressman Todd Akin of Missouri, and Republican 
Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, sponsored the Pledge Protection Act of 
2003/03 according to which: "No court established by Act of Congress 
shall have jurisdiction to hear or determine any claim that the recitation 
of the Pledge of Allegiance, as set forth in section 4 of title 4, violates the 
first article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States. "204 
As Congress seems poised to enter the fray, especially during a 
Presidential election year, should the Court hand down a plurality 
decision or strike down the words "under God' in the Pledge, fireworks 
might truly begin to fly. As such, the Court should ask itself whether it is 
willing to set up a show down with Congress, which has clearly and 
unequivocally gone on the record demonstrating its support of the 
current wording of the Pledge. 
Pledge of Allegiance. Pub. L. No. 107-293,2690, 116 Stat. 2057 (2002). 
200. A power struggle between Congress and the Court re-emerged in 1995 when for the tlrst 
time since 1937, it invalidated a federal statute. In U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court 
invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act on the basis that Congress exceeded its authority in 
basing the statute on the Commerce Clause. For a discussion of this case, see Charles j. Russo, 
United States v. Lopez and the Demise of the Gun-Free School Zones Act: Legislative Over-reaching or 
Judicial Nit-picking?, 99 Educ. L. Rep. 11-23 ( 1995). For a similar dispute, wherein the Court vitiated 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). For 
discussion of Flores, see Ralph D. Mawdsley, Flores v. City of Boerne: Testing the Constitutionality of 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 115 Educ. L. Rep. 593 ( 1997). 
201. Stephen Dinan, DeLay Threatens to Curb Courts' Jurisdiction: Vents Ire Over Pledge of 
Allegiance. Washington Times A4 (Mar. 6, 2003). 
202. Id. 
203. H.R. 108-2028 (2003), introduced in the House on May 8, 2003. Senator Orrin Hatch, 
Republican from Utah, introduced the same Bill in the Senate, on june 19, 2003. Sen. 108-1297 
(2003). 
204. For news coverage of this proposed bill, see e.g., Editorial, Delay's Raiders, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch B2 (Aug. 3, 2003) (discussing the Pledge Protection Act); Letters to the Editor: We Must 
Keep "Under God" In the Pledge from U.S. Rep. Todd Akin, St. Louis Post-Dispatch B6 (Aug. 25, 
2003). 
301] SUPREME COURT AND PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE 329 
V. CONCLUSION 
In sum, it will be interesting to observe whether the Court accepts the 
Newdow plaintiffs argument that his daughter was harmed by having to 
listen to a recitation about God because he, but apparently not she nor 
her mother, does not want her exposed to something with which he 
disagrees. By analogy, since courts are generally unreceptive to similar 
arguments when parents challenge curricular content such as reading 
series205 and sex education programs,206 there is no reason to expect that 
the Supreme Court would be any more willing to be swayed by the 
father's arguments. Further, if the Court does address the merits of the 
claim, it bears watching to see whether it limits its rationale to the 
narrower basis of the Ninth Circuit's ruling, which struck the policy 
down on the basis that it coerced a religious act/07 or whether it responds 
to the trial court's having struck the Pledge down on the ground that the 
words "under God" were unconstitutional. 
The way in which the Supreme Court clarifies the place of religious 
activity in schools, vis-a-vis the words "under God" in the Pledge, is likely 
to have a major impact on the future since the manner in which this 
debate plays out will reveal whether Americans still cherish the 
underlying values of freedom of religion (and speech) that contribute so 
greatly to the Nation's history. That is, as an argument can be made that 
secularists and strict separationists are seeking to transform the United 
States into a post-Christian secularized society by virtue of their seeking 
to remove all references to religion, whether dealing with the Ten 
Commandments in schools, or references to the "holiday" rather than 
Christmas,208 the Court is on the front line of either upholding long 
cherished traditions, or perhaps setting in motion further conflict that 
might affect its very jurisdiction in such disputes. 
If the Court were to strike down the words "under God" in the 
Pledge, it is hard to know where, absent Congressional intervention, this 
205. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ .• 827 F.3d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
4!\4 U.S. 1066 ( 1988) (rejecting a parental challenge to the content of a reading series in classes on the 
basis that exposing children to "something does not constitute teaching, indoctrination, opposition 
or promotion of ... any particular value or religion."). 
206. Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995) (denying parental 
challenges to an explicit sex-AIDS education program). 
207. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 487. 
208. For an interesting reflection of this issue, see jay Nordlinger, December's C- Word: Who 
would have thought that "Christmas" would become verboten? (Don't answer that). Natl. Rev. 26 
(Dec. 31, 2003); see also Diana West, Censorship across the divide: 'Epithet' that! 
<http://www.townhall.com/columnists/dianawest/dw20040105.shtml> (Jan. 5, 2003) (decrying 
attempts offer the greeting "Merry Christmas"). 
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trend will reach its (il)logical extreme. For example, although it has 
already been upheld, perhaps further challenges could be forthcoming to 
references to God on currency.209 Constitutional disclaims 
notwithstanding,210 future litigation might question the validity of the 
reference to God in Oaths of Office211 or in the Supreme Court itself. 
Recognizing the place of religion in the American colonies and the early 
Republic, one can only imagine that most of the Founders would be 
spinning in their graves in opposition to such a transformation of 
American societf 12 if such a trend were to continue unabated. 
209. Aronow v. U.S., 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970) (upholding "in God we trust" on United 
States currency and coins). 
210. U.S. Cons!. art. Vl, cl. 3: 
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State 
Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several 
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious 
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United 
States. 
211. See e.g. 5 U.S. C. § 3331: 
An individual, except the President, elected or appointed to an office of honor or profit in the 
civil service or uniformed services, shall take the following oath: "I, AB, do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, 
foreign and domestic ... So help me God." This section does not affect other oaths required by 
law. 
212. See e.g. Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution Ch. 9, 174 (Ivan R. 
Dee, Inc. 1988). 
